Two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two-stage game assuming equal within-group sharing and endogenous group sizes. It is shown how agents leave groups with high productive efficiency and migrate to groups with high appropriative and defensive capabilities.
1 The first is collective rent seeking (Katz et al., 1990; Baik and Shogren, 1995; Hausken, 1995a Hausken, ,b, 1998 Baik and Lee, 1997; Lee, 1995; Nitzan, 1991a Nitzan, ,b, 1994 . The second is the analysis of the impact of product-market competition on managerial slack (Hart, 1983; Horn et al., 1995; Tirole, 1988; Vickers, 1995; Winter, 1971) . The third involves conflict between actors (Grossman, 1991; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Hausken, 2000; Hirshleifer, 1995; Neary, 1997; Skaperdas, 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997; Usher, 1992; Usher and Engineer, 1987; Noh, 1998). Consider two groups in competition. Agent j in group i is endowed with an initial resource endowment r which may either not be allocated (free-riding, leisure), or may be allocated w to i ij production and s to appropriation and defense (appropriation for short), 0 # w 1 s 5 r , i 5 1,2.
ij ij ij i
Two groups with sizes n and n produce consumable output (products, goods, outcomes, prizes, 1 2 benefits, rewards, payoffs)
where B and B specify how efficiently output is produced. Applying the conventional ratio form 1 2 (Tullock, 1967) to determine each group's and each agent's ability to appropriate output, agent j's 2 payoff in group 1 is
where S is the set of all strategies by all agents in the two groups except agent j, m is the between-group decisiveness which specifies between-group sharing, and F and F specify how 1 2 effectively output is appropriated (and defended). Allocation into production leads to enlargement of the size of the pie of output produced by the two groups, while allocation into appropriation increases the share of the pie accruing to each group. We analyze a two-stage game, solve each agent's maximization problem and check when 2ij P (s ,S ) . r to avoid free-riding. In the first stage agents decide which group to belong to, ij ij i dependent on which group gives the highest payoff, suitably taking into account how the agents allocate their endowments between production and appropriation in the second stage. In so doing, each agent takes all the other agents' group membership decisions as given. Acknowledging equivalent agents, maximizing the aggregate group payoff is equivalent to maximizing the individual payoff in a symmetric equilibrium where each agent receives the same payoff. In so doing, agent j takes suitably into account how the agents allocate their endowments between production and appropriation in the second stage. In the second stage the agents make their choices simultaneously and independently, taking the group sizes n and n as given. Agent j in group 1 takes the production 1 2 versus appropriation allocation of the other agents in group 1 as given, and also takes the production versus appropriation allocation w versus s of the agents in group 2 as given. He then chooses s to 2v 2v 1j maximize his payoff. We first consider the second-stage decision. Setting the derivative of
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium identical agents devote the same amounts w 5 w and s 5 s to 1j 1 1 j 1 production and appropriation, respectively. (2) simplifies to 
In the first stage, agent j chooses groups 1 or 2 to maximize his payoff. Agent j is indifferent w.r.t.
* *
group membership when P 5 P . Applying (4), (6), and n 1 n 5 N, gives
n m(n r B 1 n r B ) 
Free-riding is avoided when P (s ,S ) . r , which gives 
for fixed sized groups and n r n
S D for intergroup migration. An agent in group 1 prefers intergroup migration rather than fixed sized * groups when (10) is larger than P in (6), i.e.
The result in (4) is well known in the literature (Hirshleifer, 1991; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997) . The results in (5)- (13) causes higher productivity and payoffs in group 1, and more appropriation and lower payoffs in group 2. (5) Increasing decisiveness m causes larger allocation to appropriation and lower payoffs. (6) The ratio of the payoffs in groups 1 and 2 is inversely proportional to the ratio n /n of the group sizes, The significance of the results lies in the non-trivial implications of the model for resource allocation (division of labor) for each agent, welfare between groups, intergroup migration, and adjustment of group size. Central to the model is the placement of consumable output in a common pool. This creates a benchmark for individual and group behavior where property rights are determined (Neary, 1997) by each group's ability to appropriate from the common pool. Determining property rights by other factors, e.g. closeness to production or judicial criteria for ownership, and allowing appropriated output not to be 100% exploitable (Grossman and Kim, 1995) , suggest an opposite benchmark where appropriation is absent. The former benchmark causes agents up to a point to beat rather than join the group with higher productive efficiency. A group may cause movement toward, without reaching, the latter benchmark by increasing its appropriative capability, encouraging the other group to increase its productive efficiency, decreasing the between-group decisiveness, or forbidding emigration (implies higher payoff to the other group).
